Articles Posted in Motorcycle Accidents

In City of Denton v. Paper the Texas Supreme Court raised the bar a little higher for users of the public streets to recover for injuries resulting from city construction defects. The City of Denton Waste Water Department cut a city street and made a repair to a sewer line. After completing the repair the City filled the hole, removed the barricades, and left. While the City claims to have repacked the hole, the surface settled over two inches in the first week. About a week later Robin Paper was riding her bicycle when she struck the sunken area, pitched over her handlebars and sustained serious injuries. She sued the City pursuant to the Texas Tort Claims Act alleging that sunken area constituted a special defect under the Act for which the City was liable.

The Texas Tort Claims Act severely limits the liability of governmental units. The liability of a governmental unit regarding a public roadway defect generally depends on whether the defect is a general premises defect or a special defect under the terms of the Act. The liability of a governmental unit for a regular premises defect is limited to the liability of a licensee under Texas law. A landowner has a general duty to a licensee not to willfully or wantonly injure the licensee and to warn of defects of which the landowner has actual knowledge and of which the licensee has no knowledge. If a landowner has no knowledge of a defect then it simply has no duty to a licensee.

The Texas Supreme Court summarized Texas law regarding ordinary premises liability stating, “The Tort Claims Act provides that, in an ordinary premises liability claim, the governmental unit owes only the duty “that a private person owes to a licensee on private property, unless the claimant pays for the use of the premises.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.022(a). Under Texas law, a licensor of real property owes a duty not to injure the licensee by willful or wanton acts or omissions or gross negligence. State Dep’t of Highways & Public Transp. v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex. 1992). When the governmental unit has actual knowledge of a dangerous condition and the licensee does not, the government must either warn the licensee or make the condition safe. State v. Tennison, 509 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Tex. 1974).”

The United States Supreme Court ruled that Obamacare is constitutional in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius by holding that the penalty for not complying with the individual mandate to buy health insurance is actually a tax rather than a penalty. Regardless of whether you think that Obamacare is a compassionate law that will save humanity or an evil plot to shove our country into socialism the law is what it is. Most lawyers simply shrug their shoulders and admit that the law probably is a tax.

Forget for a minute that the Obama administration argues for political reasons that the law creates a penalty rather than a tax. The penalty only applies to individuals who do not purchase health insurance. The federal government unquestionably has the authority to use taxes to encourage or discourage certain behaviors and regularly does so. The penalty is based on the amount of the individual’s income and is paid to the IRS. Sounds like a tax. The amount of the penalty is determined based on a schedule that starts at $9500 in individual income and increases at the rate of approximately 2.5% of income but is capped at the cost of an Obamacare “Bronze” health plan which is estimated to cost between $4500 and $5000 in 2016 and to increase thereafter. Sounds even more like a tax.

If it walks like a duck, quacks like a duck, and looks like a duck then it probably is a duck. Love it or hate it, the Obamacare individual mandate penalty probably is a tax.

The Texas Supreme Court in Texas Mutual Insurance Company v. Ruttiger recently effectively gave Texas workers compensation carriers immunity for their bad faith misconduct committed during the claims handling process. In Ruttiger, Timothy Ruttiger was injured on the job and filed a workers’ compensation claim. The employer took the position that Ruttiger’s injury was not job related. Anyone who has dealt with workers’ compensation adjusters knows that their evaluation as to whether an injury is work-related is little more than a hunt for an excuse to deny the claim. The employer’s unsupported assertion was more than enough for the Texas Mutual Insurance adjuster and the claim was denied.

At trial the credible evidence proved both that Ruttiger had sustained an on-the-job injury and that Texas Mutual had acted in bad faith in denying the claim. The First Court of Appeals in Houston upheld the Trial Court and Texas Mutual appealed to the Texas Supreme Court. The Texas Supreme Court recently issued an opinion reversing the First Court of Appeals and eliminating the common law cause of action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in connection with the handling of a workers’ compensation claim.

Insurance companies are purely economic institutions. They have no conscience and are amoral in their approach. This is not so much a criticism but rather a simple and candid observation that an insurance company will do what is in its’ economic best interest. The potential for a bad faith claim gives the carrier the economic interest to act in good faith. Without the potential for a bad faith claim hanging over the insurance company’s head unchecked workers’ compensation company bad faith will likely become norm.

The Forth Worth Court of Appeals recently released the opinion in Medlen v.Strickland holding that a pet owner could recover sentimental or intrinsic value damages for the loss of a pet. The Medlen opinion flies in the face of the 120 year old Texas Supreme Court case of Heiligmann v. Rose decided in 1891. In Heiligmann the Texas Supreme Court held that the value of a dog was to be determined either by the market value or the pecuniary value to the owner. No case since that time has held that a pet owner could recover sentimental damages for the loss of a pet. The Medlen Court points to the more recent Texas Supreme Court cases of City of Tyler v. Likes and Porras v. Craig, both of which held that when personal property has little or no market value that the intrinsic or sentimental value may be used as a measure of damages. No court has applied this analysis to the loss of a pet until Medlen.

Medlen v. Strickland raises a number of interesting questions. If a motorist strikes and injures a cat in the roadway will the motorist, and consequently his automobile liability insurance company, be potentially liable to the cat’s owner for sentimental damages? If a dog escapes from a fenced enclosure and kills the neighbors’ pot bellied pig will the dog owner, and consequently his homeowner’s liability carrier, be liable for intrinsic value damages for the death of the pig? If a dog expires during a medical procedure will the veterinarian, and consequently her malpractice liability carrier, be potentially liable for sentimental damages?

Since Medlen contradicts a 120 year old legal precedent it is highly likely that the Texas Supreme Court will agree to hear this matter. Studies suggest a very high correlation between insurance industry interests and Texas Supreme Court rulings in recent years. With the malpractice liability insurance industry, the automobile liability insurance industry and the homeowner’s liability insurance industry all having a “dog in this hunt”, Medlen v. Strickland is likely to be short lived.

The original Medicare statute, 42 U.S.C. 1395, contains no provisions for a Medicare set aside in liability cases. The original statute provided for a set aside in worker’s compensation cases and those provisions have been extended by policy but not by regulation to liability cases. The CMS website has memos which shed light on the CMS expectations regarding Liability Medicare Set Asides (LMSA) but these memos technically have only the power of persuasion.

The Big R Towing case blessed the establishment of a LMSA. The Schexnayder case held that CMS approval of a LMSA is not required. The Guidry case in 2011 again approved a LMSA proposal. The United States Supreme Court in Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), set forth the analysis for determining whether an agency policy is enforceable. To be enforceable Congress must have spoken clearly on the issue or the agency’s position must be a reasonable interpretation of the statute.

The Medicare statute is silent as to LMSAs and Congress has not otherwise addressed LMSAs. The MSP Act is at best vague and ambiguous regarding the issue of LMSAs. Medicare has not me the Chevron test. In Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000), the United States Supreme Court held that internal agency interpretations and memorandums have the power of persuasion only. Nonetheless, the prudent practitioner would be well advised to thoroughly document their file including showing the factors considered in determining if a LMSA is appropriate and preparing an allocation showing the amounts allocated to each element of damages.

In Brainard v. Trinity Universal Insurance Company the Plaintiff was killed when his vehicle was struck by an oilfield truck. He left a widow and five children. The well service company that employed the at-fault truck driver was underinsured and Brainard’s family and Estate made a claim for underinsured motorist benefits against their own carrier, Trinity Universal Insurance Company. Trinity refused to pay the benefits.

A claim for uninsured motorist benefits is a suit on a contract. Pursuant to Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code Section 38.002 the successful litigant in a suit on a contract is entitled to recover attorney fees. In order to recover attorney fees the Plaintiff must be represented by counsel, present the claim to the insurance company, and the insurance company must have failed to pay the claim within 30 days of presentment. There is no question that Brainard made a UIM claim and that Trinity Universal failed to pay the claim within 30 days. The jury rendered against Trinity which included underinsured motorist benefits and attorneys fees. Trinity Universal claimed that they simply had no duty to pay policy benefits until there was a legal determination and thus the obligation to pay attorney fees would not accrue unless they failed to pay benefits within 30 days after a judgment became final. The Texas Supreme Court agreed thus causing consumers to bear the burden of the attorneys fees necessary to force underinsured motorist carriers to pay even the most obvious and legitimate of claims.

The Brainard decision allows UIM carriers to use litigation as leverage in an attempt to pay their insureds less uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits than the insureds are entitled to receive.

On September 1, 2011, Section 82.0651 of the Texas Government Code went into effect. Section 82.0651 allows a barratry lawyer to collect from an ambulance chasing lawyer or his investigator a $10,000 fine as well as the attorneys fees and expenses expended in the collection of the fine. The fine is considered a liquidated damage and is paid to the solicitation victim who refused to sign a contract with the unscrupulous attorney.

A number of Texas lawyers have risen to the occasion and are openly advertising that they will assist solicitation victims. The most common scenario is when an auto or truck wreck occurs the innocent drivers or passengers are solicited by “ambulance chasers.” These attorneys oftentimes use so-called “investigators” to do their dirty work but it is also common, particularly in severe injury accidents, for the lawyer himself to personally contact the victims or their families and illegally solicit employment. Each of the acts of solicitation gives rise to a $10,000 penalty payable to the victim.

In the East Texas area Craig Daugherty of Tyler is assisting solicitation victims. In South Texas, Bill Edwards of Corpus Christi has been actively pursuing ambulance chasing attorneys for a number of years. In the Dallas/Fort Worth area Chris Whitaker with the firm of John R. Salazar P.C. is pursuing lawyers who violate the barratry laws. In Houston attorney Thomas J. Henry offers to assist injured claimants who have been solicited by police officers, tow-truck drivers, body shop employees, telemarketers, funeral home personnel, news reporters, clergy, chiropractors, doctors, hospital employees, insurance agents, or law firm “investigators” who work with unethical attorneys. These “case-runners” are usually working on a commission basis for an attorney and may offer gifts, money or promises in an attempt to get the injured victims to sign a contract with a particular attorney.

The addition of an underinsured motorist claim to a Texas tort claim often adds a third and sometimes a fourth choice of venue. Texas venue rules provide that a tort claim may be brought both where the accident took place or where the tortfeasor resides at the time of the occurrence. However, an underinsured motorist claim is a suit on a contract and may be brought in the county of the corporate defendants’ principal place of business or where the contract is to be substantially performed.

Consider for example the situation where a driver from Gilmer and a driver from Longview both go to Tyler to shop and become involved in an auto accident caused by the Longview driver. Based on these facts alone the venue rules would allow the lawsuit to be filed in either Smith County or Gregg County…two not so great choices of venue from an injured persons’ perspective. However, add to this scenario the fact that the Gilmer resident purchased underinsured motorist coverage from an automobile liability insurance company with a principal place of business in Dallas, Texas. The place of performance of an automobile liability policy has been held to be in the county where the insured lives. Thus, the claim could be filed not only in Gregg and Smith counties but also in Upshur and Dallas counties. Under Texas venue rules if venue is proper as to any Defendant then it is deemed proper as to all Defendants. Thus the claim could be properly filed in Upshur County which is a much more claimant friendly choice of venue.

The Defendants may challenge the Plaintiff’s choice of venue. However, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 51(b) provides that: “Whenever a claim is one heretofore cognizable only after another claim has been prosecuted to a conclusion, the two claims may be joined in a single action;….” The bringing of a tort claim and an underinsured motorist claim in the same cause of action falls squarely within the authorization of Rule 51(b).

Although every car wreck gives rise to different issues there are several things that everybody should, but usually doesn’t, know.

The at fault driver and their insurance company is not obligated to provide the auto accident victim with a rental vehicle if the victim’s vehicle is a total loss. Insurance companies sometimes pay for a rental vehicle in a total loss situation either because they initially mistakenly believed that the vehicle was repairable or because they hoped to keep the injured victim from hiring a lawyer but there is no legal requirement that they do so. The tortfeasor’s legal obligation in Texas is limited to providing a rental vehicle during the reasonable period that it take to repair the damaged vehicle.

Just because a police officer issues a traffic citation does not mean that the driver who received the ticket is legally liable for the accident. A traffic citation is what is known as an “extra-judicial finding” and it is meaningless in the legal world. However, if the person receiving the ticket pleads guilty to the allegations in the citation then their act becomes a “judicial admission” which is admissible against them. Nonetheless, insurance adjusters often place considerable weight on traffic citations and it is obviously good to have them issued in your favor.

Personal injury damages are generally not taxable. The notion is that when an injury victim sustains damages as a result of the tortuous conduct of another and subsequently obtains a recovery of personal injury damages that they are merely recouping a loss. The recovery of this loss does not result in any new income or increased benefit to the victim and they have simply been made whole or put back in the same position that they were in before the injury. Thus there is no taxable event. This is the general rule and as with all general rules there are exceptions.

Internal Revenue Code §104(a)(2) generally excludes from gross income all amounts recovered in connection with a personal injury claim. In order to qualify for this IRS exclusion the recovery must be the result of a physical injury and must have been caused by the tortuous conduct of another. In the situation where the tortuous conduct results in physical pain, mental anguish, physical impairment, disfigurement, medical expenses, loss of wage earning capacity, or other traditional elements of Texas personal injury damages then the recovery of those damages is not taxable.

The argument against taxing the recovery of “lost wages” under Texas law has been strengthened by recent legislative changes. Technically, Texas personal injury claimants have historically been limited to recovering “loss of wage earning capacity” rather than “lost wages” and the recovery of loss of wage earning capacity has not been included in taxable income under §104. This position was strengthened in 2003 when the Texas legislature enacted Civil Practice and Remedies Code §18.091. Section 18.091 provided that evidence of loss of earning capacity must be presented to the jury as a net loss after reduction for income tax payments. Thus the recovery of “loss of earning capacity” in Texas is “after tax” and it stands to reason that it would not be included in gross income for IRS purposes.

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